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STUDENT NOTE
EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN PROPERTY TAXES
The West Virginia constitution provides that
. .. taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the
State, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed
in proportion to its value to be ascertained as directed by
law. No one species of property from which a tax may be
collected shall be taxed higher than any other species of
property of equal value.. .. "I
This provision of article X, section 1 of the constitution in so
far as it relates to property taxation was first formulated in article
VIII, section 1 of the constitution of 1863. In its application to
ad valorem property tax valuation it remains unchanged to this
day. 'Ihe language of this section appears to be clear and certain,
and on its face would not seem to admit of reasonable doubt as to
its meaning. There are contained in this section three general
requirements applicable to property taxation: (1) that all taxes be
I W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
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"equal and uniform;" (2) that property shall be "taxed in propor-
tion to its value;" and (3) that "no one species of property . . .
shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal
value...."
The property tax in West Virginia, being formulated on value,
is consequently an ad valorem tax. The tax itself will be the pro-
duct of not only such value, but of the rate applied as well. Thus, to
be an "equal and uniform" tax there must not only be a uniform rate
of taxation, but a uniform mode of assessment as well, for "uniform-
ity in taxing implies equality in the burden of taxation, and this
equality of burden cannot exist without uniformity of the assessment,
as well as in the rate of taxation . 2.."2 Clearly, if two species of
property were both valued at one hundred dollars by whatever
means the value was to be determined, the application of a tax rate of
one hundred per cent to one class and of forty per cent to the other
would result in a contravention of the requirement that "no one
species of property ... shall be taxed higher than any other species
of property of equal value...."
Moreover, should any question arise concerning the true mean-
ing and import of this section, it would seem that it could be easily
resolved by application of the rule that, where possible, effect shall
be given to every part of a constitutional provision.3 Further sup-
port for the above construction of this section would seem evident in
recourse to the debates and proceedings of the First Constitutional
Convention of West Virginia. For just as the cause which moves a
legislature to enact certain legislation should always be considered
in construing such legislation,4 it follows that the same principle
should apply to interpretation of a constitutional provision.
The debate of the Constitutional Convention of 1863 on ad
valorem property taxation centered particularly on the provisions of
the Virginia constitution in effect at that time which specifically
exempted slaves from the "equal and uniform" clause of the Virginia
constitution.5 J. W. Paxton, the chairman of the Committee on Tax-
ation and Finance, stated that there was probably no feature of the
Virginia constitution that was so objectionable or odius to the people
2 Cummings v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 101 U.S. 153, 158 (1879).
3 Flesher v. Bd. of Review, 138 W. Va. 765, 77 S.E.2d 890 (1953).
4 Altmeyer v. Caulfield, 87 W. Va. 847, 17 S.E. 409 (1893).
5 VA. CoNsT. art. IV, §§ 22-3 (1851). These provisions exempted all
slaves under 12 years of age from any tax assessment, and set a fixed taxable
value of $300.00 on all other slaves, although it appeared that this was con-
siderably below their true market value at this time.
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of western Virginia as "that feature which discriminates in taxation
in relieving one species of property from taxation, necessarily to in-
crease the burden on all others ... ." This discrimination was ob-
jected to specifically in that it was in respect to valuations on prop-
erty and not in regard to the tax rates imposed (a distinction which
will later be essential). At this point Judge J. H. Brown moved to
strike the "no one species" provision as being repetitive, contending
that the "equal and uniform" clause was sufficient for the purpose
at hand, fully embracing the principle urged by Chairman Paxton.7
In reply, Mr. Van Winkle stated:
"If the convention strikes out what they are asked to strike out
... this principle of ad valorem taxation, so far as it means
anything is lost, killed and destroyed. Now, merely to say that
when you tax a species of property you shall tax it so much on
its value is saying very little. To say that it shall be equal and
uniform is saying very little .... the question proposed for this
convention to decide is whether they do want taxes that are
really alike or ... .be treated as we have been under the present
constitution, by which an unjust proportion of taxes as every-
body knows, has been paid by the western section of the
Commonwealth...." 8
The Brown amendment was subsequently defeated by a substantial
majority,9 and the language proposed by Mr. Paxton was incorpor-
ated verbatim into the constitution of West Virginia.' 0 In valuation
of property for ad valorem property taxation these provisions
adopted in our first constitution have continued in this same form to
the present time.
The language of this section is so perspicuous that it would seem
that no one could disagree with Mr. Van Winkle when he said that
"there can be no mistake about it if these words are left in."" Cer-
tainly the history of this section as briefly outlined above should
6 3 DEBATES & PRocEEDINGs oF T Frost CONSITrTIONAL CONVENTION
oF Wis Vmom'A 55 (Ambler 1939).
7Id. at .56.
81 d. at 58.
9.d. at 80.
10 It should be noted that at the time of the constitutional debates, the 14th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution with its "equal protection" provision was
not in effect, since the constitution of West Virginia became effective on June
30, 1863, while the 14th Amendment was not operative until 1868. Moreover
the "equal protection" clause of the 14th Amendment is restricted in its appli-
cation only to unequal taxation of property within classes of property, per-
mitting divergences in valuations between different classes of property. In re
Nat'l Bank, 137 W. Va. 673, 73 S.E.2d 655 (1952) (following Sioux City
Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923)).
n1 Ambler, op. cit. supra note 7, at 59.
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resolve all doubts as to the validity of any deviation from uniformity
in property valuations. However, in a recent West Virginia case,
12
the Supreme Court of Appeals was called upon to decide whether
the imposition of an ad valorem property tax of one hundred per cent
of the true and actual value of bank stock, while other property in
the same county was systematically taxed at only approximately
forty per cent of its true and actual value, was in violation of article
X, section 1. In view of the clear and mandatory language of the
"no one species" provision, and of the entire section and its historical
formulation, the majority of the court held that the systematic and
deliberate assessment of one species of property at a higher valua-
tion than other species of property within the taxing unit was in vio-
lation of such section. The taxpayer was thus held to be entitled to
have the assessment reduced to the approximate level of valuation of
other species of property generally.
13
Two members of the court, however, dissented on the basis that
the majority opinion was a "logically inconsistent and legally un-
sound" decision going "in the face of a heretofore unbroken line of
well considered cases in which this Court reached an opposite and
entirely different conclusion" and would become finally a "chaotic
and utterly impractical innovation" in the orderly functions of tax
collection.14 In spite of such an incisive and strident dissent, it is
submitted that this decision was not a turning point in the estab-
lishment of an innovation in the law, but was at least a return to
the law from a spurious course which the court had been inadvert-
ently and unconciously pursuing, if not in fact the first instance in
which the court has been called upon to consider and squarely apply
the "no one species" clause of article X, section 1.
A clear distinction must be made in a discussion of property
tax valuations between the coverage and effect of article X, section
1, and the fourteenth amendment provision concerning "equal pro-
tection of the laws."' 5 Under the fourteenth amendment, classifica-
tions for the purposes of property taxation may be devised to any
12 In re Kanawha Valley Bank, 109 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1959).
13 Ibid.
14 Id. at 688. The court noted in In re Charleston Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n., 125 W. Va. 506, 80 S.E.2d 513 (1944) that while the constitution re-
quired uniformity and equality in taxation... no one has ever believed that
either could be attained as a practical matter." The court however pointed
out that "the constitutional provision is a statement of an ideal, and is imple-
mented by numerous statutes, all seeking to put into practice such ideal so
far as is humanely possible. Id. at 515.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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extent within which they retain a factual basis for different treat-
ment of various types of property.' 6 Thus, a West Virginia case
considered under the pale of the fourteenth amendment, allowed re-
duction of an assessment of utility property assessed at one hundred
per cent of its true and actual value, while property in the same
county of that same class was generally taxed at only eighty per cent
of value.17 The relief there was granted in that the disproportionate
assessments were considered purely in the same class of property.
And, while at one time there may have been the opinion that the
fourteenth amendment would permit reductions in valuations
between classes of property,'8 there is no question today but that the
relief under that amendment is limited purely to tax discrimination
within the particular classes of property that states have devised.' 0
The opinion by Justice Frankfurter in the Nashville case clearly
points out that the "equal protection" clause of the fourteenth
amendment by such construction is not nearly so restrictive as the
"narrow and sometimes cramping" provisions of state uniformity
clauses.20 That article X, section 1 would satisfy this description will
be later developed.
The 1982 West Virginia "Tax Limitation" amendment is in like
manner without effect on this discussion.21 The amendment did
not introduce the broad type of classifications permissible under the
Nashville case construction of the fourteenth amendment "equal pro-
tection" provision. While prior to this 1932 amendment of article X,
section 1, there could be neither classifications of value or of rate,
the amendment established only the restrictive type of classification
of the rate of taxation. The principle of invalidity of classifications
of taxable valuations as under the "no one species" clause is in no
way adulterated. During the consideration of taxation amendments
10 Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 862 (1939). The
variance between types of property was upheld here, although the court noted
that it was being sustained on the basis of a fiction that the Tennessee courts
had adopted to sustain over 40 years of local assessment customs and habit.
17 West Penn Power Co. v. Bd. of Review, 112 W. Va. 442, 164 S.E. 862
(1932). This case was cited by the dissenting opinion in the principal case in
support of such discrimination under art. X, § 1. However, this section of
the West Virginia Constitution was not considered in the opinion. A syllabus
point in the decision referring to valuations at which the "properties of the
same class . . .are taxed" recited in later cases therefore would not have laid
a foundation for broadening the scope of valuations under art. X, § 1.
18 Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
19 Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1939). Cf. Ray-
mond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 41 (1907) (dissenting opin-
ion, Holmes, J.).
20 Id. at 868.
21 W. VA. CONsr. art. X, § 1.
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and revision, the legislature had the opportunity to pass upon a
proposal for broad and unlimited classification of property valuation
that would have retained only uniformity as to the rate of tax to be
applied to the various classes of valuations. 22 This proposal, pro-
viding only for uniform rates of taxations, allowing then for the right
to classify property into types for purposes of valuation, was re-
jected. The "Tax Limitation" amendment, as subsequently adopted,
preserved the basic concepts that property was to be taxed "in pro-
portion to value" without variance in the manner of valuation in
different species of property, as dictated by the "no one species"
clause. In respect to valuations for ad valorem property tax assess-
ment, the amendment allowed no deviation from the principles per-
taining to discrimination between the so called classes of property.
The amendment and subsequent implementing legislation simply
provide that, within the various rate classes thereby established,
there shall be only certain maximum rates applied upon each one
hundred dollars of assessed values of property. The only standards
or prohibitions contained therein are to preclude the taxing of prop-
erties above the fixed maximum rates. Between two different types
of property within one class of rates there can still be no discrimin-
ation, as would occur by taxing bank stocks within Class I at the
maximum rate of fifty per cent, and in turn taxing livestock within
that same class at only thirty per cent of its true and actual value.
Nor could two properties of the same true and actual value be taxed
with the same rate, one at its full value and the other at only one-
half of its value. Under the maximum rates set by the amendment,
the constitution and the law are both satisfied if both properties are
valued at the same percentage of their value and if the same rate is
applied to such value. While different maximum rates are pro-
vided for the four classes established by the amendment, the par-
ticular rate applied within the set maximums cannot then be varied,
now, as well as before the amendment was adopted. Neither a vari-
ation in rates, or value determinations between different types of
properties will be permitted even today. The amendment will not
open the door to systematic departure in the form of treatment of
the conversion from actual value to assessed values, as was the prob-
lem in the principal case.
The central issue in the Kanawha Valley Bank case was not then
concerned with any variations in tax rates that might be applied
under the 1932 amendment, but rather with the problem of a delib-
2 2
REPORT OF Com., ON CONSTrrUTIONAL REVISION OF 1929, p. x.
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erate and systematic variation of the rates of valuation. The un-
contradicted facts of the case established that shares of bank stock
were assessed at one hundred per cent of their true and actual value,
whereas assessments on other classes of property within the county
were being assessed at only approximately forty per cent of their
true and actual value.23  Within the time and manner specified,
24
the taxpayer appealed a County Court ruling sustaining this assess-
ment to the Circuit Court. There the County Court ruling was
sustained on the grounds that the assessment of the bank stock could
not be reduced to conform with the local practices of assessment of
other types of property at materially lower percentages of their
value, and on review, two of the five members of the Supreme Court
of Appeals, as noted, would have accepted and enforced this con-
struction of article X, section 1.25
The available remedies to a taxpayer contesting an allegedly
unconstitutional assessment, as in the principal case, are well estab-
lished. In every case it is first incumbent upon the taxpayer to dem-
onstrate clearly and positively: (1) that his property has been de-
signedly and systematically assessed at a substantially higher pro-
portion of its true and actual value than other property generally; 2
(2) that these deviations in assessment are systematic and amount
to more than mere sporadic variances;27 (3) that the lower court's
judgment was plainly wrong; 28 (4) and that the error be so plain
as to be equivalent to a fraud upon the taxpayer's right.20 The
complainant must further submit a high degree of proof to support
these contentions, as the courts are reluctant to disturb an assessor's
valuations in that he is presumed to have acted correctly, since the
25 In re Kanawha Valley Bank, 109 S.E.2d 649, 653-4 (W. Va. 1959).
While the shares of bank stock were regularly and systematically assessed at
100% of their true and actual value, it was developed through the testimon
of the assesor of Kanawha County that cash on hand and money in the bank
were also taxed at 100% of their true and actual value, accounts receivable at
60% (dependent on how they were secured), livestock at a "very low" per-
centage of its value, inventories at 50% of value, machinery and equipment at
20% of the original cost, and real estate at anywhere from 9% to 130% of its
value, not considering an approximate increase of 25% in general land values
since 1.950 (p. 653). The adoption by the majority opinion of 40% as stand-
ard approximate assessment on true and actual value was based on the asses-
sor's stated objective of attempting to assess all other property aside from bank
stock at 40% of true and actual value in accordance with W. VA. CODE ch. 18,
art 9A, § 15 (Michie 1955).
24 W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 3, § 25 (Michie 1955).
25 In re Kanawha Valley Bank, 109 S.E.2d 649, 688 (W. Va. 1959).
26 Roanoke v. Williams, 161 Va. 351, 170 S.E. 726 (1933).
27 Roanoke v. Gibson, 161 Va. 3,2, 170 S.E. 723 (1933).
28 Liberty Coal v. Bassett, 108 W. Va. 293, 150 S.E. 745 (1929).
29 Crouch v. County Court, 116 W. Va. 476, 181 S.E. 819 (1935).
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true and actual facts are more within the scope of his peculiar
knowledge80
Upon satisfactory establishment of the foregoing, the general
means of relief available to the aggrieved taxpayer, where state laws
so provide, will be a reduction of the excessive portion of the assess-
ment to the level of valuations generally prevailing in the particular
governmental unit.31 In some states provision for relief has not been
allowed until the tax has actually been levied, whereupon the tax-
payer may then seek an injunction against the collection of its dis-
criminatory excess.3 2 In West Virginia, the proper means of relief,
as demonstrated by the principal case, is clearly the former1 3
Considering once again the facts of the principal case, it would
seem that a situation was thus presented to give the taxpayer access
to the above outlined remedies under West Virginia's "narrow and
restrictive" "no one species" clause. The dissent in this case con-
tended that the issue presented was "manifestly not one of first im-
pression in this stat&e" in that the court on seven prior occasions in
considering the "equal and uniform" and "no one species" provisions
of article X, section 1, had succeeded in "harmonizing' them
so as "to avoid the apparently irreconcilable conflict between
them."34  The very admission by the dissenting members of the
court that there is an obvious conflict between these provisions
of the constitution and the results previously obtained thereunder
on classifications of tax values indicates at least a marked degree of
judicial conservatism in sustaining a rule of law in the face of ob-
vious constitutional contrariety. There appears, moreover, to be no
authority directly in point in West Virginia on the subject of tax-
able valuations under the "no one species" clause. Past decisions
bearing on unequal valuations have been decided upon application
of the "equal and uniform" provisions of either the fourteenth
30 Central Realty v. Bd. of Review, 110 W. Va. 437, 159 S.E. 537 (1931).
31 West Penn Power Co. v. Bd. of Review, 112 W.Va. 442, 164 S.E. 862
(1932). The case states the general rule that as to property taxation, uniform-
ity is required only within each taxing unit, and for the purposes of county
taxes, the county will be the governmental unit.32 Town of Wytheville v. Johnson, 108 Va. 589, 62 S.E. 328 (1908). At
one time it was held that equity would never enjoin the collection of taxes.
Wagner v. Leenhouts, 208 Wis. 292, 242 N.W. 144 (1932). Today, most
courts including Virginia have restricted injunctive relief to cases where it in-
volves assessments on a tax unauthorized by law, or upon property legally ex-
empt from taxation, or where property has been fraudulently assessed at a high
amount. Commonwealth v. Tredegar Co., 122 Va. 506, 95 S.E. 279 (1918).
Bristor v. Bd. of Assessors, 346 Ill. 362, 179 N.E. 120 (1931).33 In re Kanawha Valley Bank, 109 S.E.2d 659 (W. Va. 1959).
34 Id. at 683.
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amendment of the United States constitution, or of this particular
clause of the West Virginia constitution, exclusive of the "no one
species" provision.
]:n the first West Virginia case involving an appeal of an alleg-
edly excessive tax valuation, the court held that a code provision',
prescribing the manner for ascertaining the value of toll bridges by
multiplying their annual value by ten was constitutional under the
"equal and uniform" clause of article X, section 1, exclusive of the
no one species" proviso.36 The reason for the omission of this im-
portant qualification of the "equal and uniform" section was the
limitation of the litigation issue to the validity of the method of as-
certaining the value of the particular realty in question, without
comparison to assessments of any other property within the county.3 7
Without recognizing the narrow scope of the problem immediately
before the court, a syllabus point broadly declared that "a tax upon
all business of the same class which is uniform as to that kind of
business, is not unconstitutional."38 (Emphasis added). In 1940
the cDurt was again called upon to apply article X, section 1 in re-
gard to the then operative state income tax law's classifications of
personal and corporate income, 9 which, under the purview of the
"equal and uniform" clause alone, the court held valid citing the
above noted syllabus point of the Charleston & South Bridge Co.
case. The statement was enlarged at this time by replacing the
word "business" and substituting the more inclusive phrase of all
".... property, business or incomes of the same class .... "40 The
error of over-simplification by generalization was thus compounded,
although the chimerical barrier to relief against discrimination in
property tax valuation only recently failed, by a one vote margin of
the court, to achieve full legitimization.
In 1943 the court, while upholding code provisions prescribing
the methods for valuing the property of building and loan associ-
ations,41 again followed the two prior cases stating that ". . . the
contention that we should reduce the assessment of the association's
property because, as contended, certain property of other classes,
35 W. VA. CODE of 1863, ch. 118, § 48 (now W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 4,
§ 20 (Michie 1955).30 Charleston & South Bridge Co. v. Kanawha County Court, 41 W. Va.
658,24 S.E. 1002 (1896).
37Id. at 660.
38 Id. at 658, syllabus point 4.
3a, W. Va. Acts 1943, ch. 96, at 330.40 Christopher v. James, 122 W. Va. 665, 12 S.E.2d 818 (1940).
43 W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 3, § 14A (Michie 1955).
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particularly real estate, is assessed at something less than its true and
actual value is without merit."42 While the "no one species" clause
was mentioned in the opinion on this occasion, its inapplicability to
the prior decisions theoretically approved in the Hancock County
case has been noted, and it further appears that there was no show-
ing in this case that different classes of property within Hancock
County were deliberately and systematically assessed at varying
levels of their true and actual value-an established contention that
became the essence of an appeal for the first time in the Kanawha
Valley Bank case.
In a 1944 decision, limited once more solely to the "equal and
uniform" clause of article X, section 1, the court continued the rule
of the Charleston & South Bridge Co. case, holding that there must
be a clear showing of discrimination against a taxpayer in the assess-
ment of the same type of property to entitle him to a reduction of
his own assessment. 43 Such discrimination was held not to be estab-
lished merely by showing that other property of different types is
assessed at less than its apparent face value by estimations and dis-
counts made in good faith in an effort to arrive at true and actual
values. 44 The alleged discriminations were thus attempted not in
the treatment of different levels of value for various classes of prop-
erty, but in the manner in which the true and actual values of prop-
erty of different types were determined initially. The restriction of
the "equal and uniform" clause to individual species of property was
continued in a 1950 decision concerning alleged disproportionate
valuations of the taxpayer's land and lands similar thereto, although
relief was denied simply because the complainant had not satisfac-
torily proven one of the essential elements requisite to an assesment
appeal - a systematic and deliberate plan of variance in the valua-
tion of different properties. 45 A 1952 appeal of discrimination in the
assessment of bank stocks was decided primarily under the "due pro-
cess" clause of the fourteenth amendment.46 Although the only
part of article X, section 1, considered was the provision providing
that the value of property should be ascertained as directed by law,
this opinion again contained language indicating that the entire sec-
4 2 In re Hancock Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 125 W. Va. 426, 25 S.E.2d 548
(1943)43 In re Charleston Fed. Say. & Loan Assn., 126 W. Va. 506, 80 S.E.2d
513 (1944).
44 Id at 516-8.45 Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. County Court, 185 W. Va. 174, 62
S.E.2d 801 (1950). See note 80 supra.46 In re Nat'l Bank, 187 W. Va. 673, 73 S.E.2d 655 (1952).
10
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tion was so broad that ".... it is not required that property... of
different classes be taxed equally and uniformily."47 In its most re-
cent decision prior to the principal case, the court repeated its pre-
vious interpretations of article X, section 1, citing with approval
the foregoing cases, when actually the problem again, as in the
Bankers Pocahontas Coal case, was but the evidentiary satisfaction
of the Roanoke case requirement, that a general plan of deviation in
assessment must be shown.48 These seven cases compose, to the
date of the decision in the principal case, the judicial history sur-
rounding and touching upon the problem of discriminatory assess-
ment and property tax valuation in West Virginia.
In none of these decisions was the "no one species" clause spe-
cifieally cited or construed in spite of the apparently clear relief
available therein. Therefore it appears that the Kanawha Valley
Bank case is the first taxpayer appeal to be presented directly under
the "no one species" clause, accompanied by positive and direct
proof of discrimination. Though it must be conceded that this
clause was included within the body of the opinion of several of the
prior cases,49 the rule of stare decisis could not be considered to be
applicable. For this principle to govern, the precise question deter-
mined in the prior decision must be presented.50 A question of law
not brought to the court's attention, or one that has not been passed
upon by the court, cannot be considered as involving the same ques-
tion.51 As noted above, the prior West Virginia cases were decided
only upon application of the "equal and uniform" clause of the West
Virginia constitution, and were not meant to include the "no one
species" provision. But even if it were to be supposed that stare
decisis was to apply, in that the court had necessarily been cognizant
of the "no one species" clause while it was deciding these cases on
the basis of the immediately preceeding parts of the same section,5
2
47.(d. at 680.
48 Western Maryland Ry. v. Bd. of Public Works, 141 W. Va. 413, 90
S.E.2d 438 (1952).49 .1n re Hancock Say. & Loan Ass'n., 125 W. Va. 426, 25 S.E.2d 543
(1943); In re Charleston Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 126 W. Va. 506, 80 S.E.2d
513 (1944). While it was earlier pointed out that these decisions were not
directy in point, it would be well to note a further quotation of the "no one
species" provision in a more recent decision involving the matter of assessments
wherein the opinion it was clearly stated that ... . equality and uniformity of
taxation as set forth in Article X, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution,
means that as to all classes of property, business or incomes there shall be
uniformity of taxation." In re Southern Land Co., 100 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va.
1959).
50 Soto v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 141 W. Va. 373, 95 S.E.2d 769 (1956).
51 Southern Ry v. Childrey, 113 Va. 376, 74 S.E. 221 (1912).
52-Yn re Kanawha Valley Bank, 109 S.E.2d 649, 684 (W. Va. 1959).
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a cardinal limitation of stare decisis has been stated by our court in
this manner:
"WVhenever a decision of this court is found, on careful consid-
eration, to be illogical, opposed to public policy, and subversive
of the supreme law of the land, the public welfare, and the sov-
ereignty of the people.., it is the solemn duty of this court to
dissapprove it and end its evil influences .... [N] o legal princi-
ple is ever settled until it is settled right ... ."53
Had the court thus indirectly concluded that the "no one
species" clause was without meaning, or were stare decisis to be
tortured to the extent of considering the ommission of this clause
a conscious emasculization thereof, ample authority of other states
is available to establish the inherent force and efficacy of the provi-
sion.54 This authority is best summarized by a statement of judge
Taft (later Chief justice of the U. S. Supreme Court) in a circuit
court opinion construing the "no one species" clause of the Ten-
nessee constitution identical in every respect to our own:
"The sole and manifest purpose of the constitution was to secure
uniformity and equality of burden upon all property in the state.
As a means of doing so . . . it provided that the assessment
should be according to its true and actual value. It emphasized
the object of the section by expressly providing that no species
of property should be taxed higher than any other species.
We have before us a case in which the complaining tax-
payer, and other taxpayers owning the same species of property,
are taxed at a higher rate [of values used in fixing as-
sessed values] than the owners of other species of property.
This does not come about by legislative discrimination, but
by the intentional and systematic disregard of the law by
those charged with the duty of assessing all other species of
property than that owned by complainant and fellows of the
same class. This is a flagrant violation of the clause of the
constitution forbidding discrimination in taxation between dif-
ferent species of property. That clause is self executing....-55
53 Ralston v. Weston, 48 W. Va. 170, 86 S.E. 446 (1900).54 White River Lumber Co. v. State, 175 Ark. 956, 2 S.E.2d 25 (1928);
Ex parte Fort Smith v. Van Buren Bridge Co., 62 Ark. 461, 36 S.E. 1060
(1896); Taylor v. Louisville & N. Ry., 88 Fed. 850 (6th Cir. 1898). The ma-
jority opinion in the principal case stated herein that no cases had been cited
or found in other 'urisdictions that would permit discriminatory assessment of
property for ad valorem property tax purposes under a constitutional provision
which contained a "no one species" clause. In re Kanawha Valley Bank, 109
S.E.2d 649, 664 (W. Va. 1959).
55 Taylor v. Louisville & N. Ry., 88 Fed. 850 (6th Cir. 1898).
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Th2is same principle has also been enunciated by courts in states
whose constitutions do not contain the "no one species" clause. The
Texas constitution is similar to the West Virginia constitution in that
it contains provisions for uniformity and equality in property taxation
and provides that property shall be taxed in proportion to its value 0
In the absence of a "no one species" clause, the Texas court has held
that the "in proportion to value" clause by itself was sufficient to re-
quire a reduction in the tax imposed upon shares of bank stock
where they were assessed at one hundred per cent of their true and
actual value while realty was generally assessed at only approxim-
ately fifty per cent of its true and actual value. 57 The Kentucky
court adopts this same view and has reduced the assessment of the
property of a taxpayer which was assessed at seventy-five per cent of
its actual value while other taxable property was generally taxed at
only fifty-two per cent of its value, solely under the purview of the
"in proportion to value" clause of the Kentucky constitution. 8 The
language of the Illinois constitution is similarly restricted in that it
provides only that the legislature might obtain revenue by 'levying
a tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay
a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property... ."" In
a case wherein bank stock and other personal property was taxed at
a value level of thirty-two per cent above the level of valuation for
real estate, this provision was held to ". . . preclude (s) discrimina-
tion... against any class of property.. ." and that were the legis-
lature to provide that different classes of property were to be valued
differently or at different proportions of their full value "... the Con-
stitution and the law are both violated."60
It seems clear then that, under the limited scope of the "in
proportion to its value" clause as contained in the West Virginia
constitution, there is substantial and impelling opinion preventing
discrimination in assessment valuation of different classes of property.
The same result has been more directly achieved in courts of other
states under the "equal and uniform" provision as it is contained in
our own constitution. Moreover, the constructions of the "no one
species" clauses as exemplified by the Taylor case have been so clear
and forceful that its apparent meaning is indeed beyond reasonable
doubt. As Judge Taft said, it is "self executing." The inclusion of
56 TExAs CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1.
5 7 Porter v. Langley, 155 S.W. 1042 (Tex. Ct App. 1913).
5S Greene v. Louisville & Interurban Rr. Co., 244 U.S. 499 (1916).
50 IR.. CoNST. art. IX, § 1.6 0 First Natl Bank v. Holmes, 246 Ill. 362, 92 N.E. 893, 895 (1910).
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this clause in our own constitution by the members of the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1868 was specifically designed to achieve this
same end. In view of these considerations, it is submitted that the
West Virginia court has correctly stated the principles embodied
in this section in its decision in the Kanawha Valley Bank case. The
overstated generalizations of prior West Virginia cases do not dictate
or require a contrary result. The debates and proceedings of our
constitution convention ivould militate most formidably against any
other conclusion. The unquestionable weight of authority and the
clear and specific language of this section as it has been interpreted
by our sister states plainly support the West Virginia court's deci-
sion. If the interpretation and application proposed by the dissent-
ing opinion were to represent a more efficient and workable
mechanical system of taxation, or beyond this were to embrace the
will and disposition of the people of this state for the adoption of
unlimited classifications of property valuations, as have been twice
presented to constitutional committees and there rejected, this
could only be achieved by amendment to the constitution itself.
Until this be done, it is submitted that the court has enunciated the
only result that the section will permit - a rule of law and a prin-
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